




A significant element in marketing costs is the middleman's
m,argin. How were these margins affected by the postwar
price squeeze in the major household appliance industry?
WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE of middlemen's oper-
ating margins? This paper suggests that the behav-
ior of margins over time affords a clue to potential
friction in marketing channels. It is therefore worth
some effort to monitor margins in order that
efficiency in distribution may be enhanced.
For several reasons, it is difficult to secure opera-
tionally useful margin data. This article presents
one way—imperfect, but usable—of dealing with
this difficulty. The major household appliance in-
dustry is used to illustrate how structural change
can cause friction among middlemen. Other indus-
tries might draw a lesson from this example.
The function of middlemen. The institutional
structure of marketing has been described as
adaptive.^ It is said to adjust its form to its function.
As this function changes so also does the
configuration of institutions. Thus, the general store
gave way to mail-order selling, the ma-and-pa store
to the supermarket, the full-service specialty store
to tlie discount house, and so on.
What is this "function" to which institutions sup-
posedly pay chameleon-like tribute? At least from
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the standpoint of producers, it is to afford efficient
access to markets.- In the manufacturer's perspec-
tive, for example, the institutional structure of mar-
keting and the middlemen comprising it represent a
means of reaching a desired market. In the case of
consumer goods, wholesalers and retailers serve to
bridge the spatial-temporal gap between the manu-
facturer and the ultimate consumers of his
products.^
Disputes over Margins
Margin is a price. The cost of such access as mid-
dlemen afford manufacturers is supposed to be
refiected in their margins—the difference between
what they charge for a product and what they must
pay for it as it moves through the channel of dis-
tribution. Tlius a "price" is paid for marketing func-
tions performed by these middlemen.*
A three-fold controversy. From time to time, the
equity of this price has been questioned. Civen that
a significant element in the total cost of marketing—
and therefore in prices paid by ultimate consumers
—is refiected in middlemen's margins, controversy
inevitably arises regarding the proper role of these
intermediaries in a marketing system. The contro-
versy seems to revolve about three basic issues.
• The question of the level of the margin.' In other
words, if margin is construed as a price paid to middle-
men for services rendered, the question is: Is the price
a just one?
• The related problem of margin determination.'̂
How and by whom is the price paid middlemen
determined?
• The notion of the relative stickiness of margins'
(perhaps the one over which most of the controversy
rages). Put another way, the concern here is over
whether prices (margins) paid middlemen reflect a
current measure of their performance as opposed to
some historical or traditional measure. In the context
of classical economic theory, this issue may be con-
strued as one concerning whether margins behave
competitively.
Significance of margins. That disputes over mar-
gin be quickly resolved is of no small concern to
many interests. An excessive margin forces the man-
ufacturer to consider alternative routes to market.
An inadequate margin militates against effective
performance by a middleman—indeed, perhaps to
the extent of zero performance. Consumers, al-
though not always explicitly, judge the value added
by middlemen and, if it strikes them as less than the
incremental cost, sales are jeopardized. In large
measure, then, the friction attendant to products
moving through their channels of distribution de-
pends on the extent to which all parties concerned
are satisfied with margins accorded middlemen.*
Postwar Situation
How conflicts arise. Even a casual observer can
appreciate that marketing channels are not friction-
less. Margin disputes are not exceptional. This is
not to say that open hostility between middlemen
and manufacturers abounds. However, it would be
somewhat naive to assert that typically there exists
a perfect communality of interests between them.^
The ways in which the several parties concerned
with middlemen's margins view them may be quite
disparate. The market forces giving rise to
conflicting views vary among the parties.^''
Following World War II, the pent-up demand for
major appliances for the kitchen and laundry ren-
dered their sale by retailers almost routine. As this
demand became satisfied, however, sales became
more difficult to effect. To cope with the extraordi-
nary postwar buying, manufacturers had expanded
their production facilities to the extent that, when
consumer demand began to slacken, excess capacity
existed. Manufacturers were therefore ripe for a
method which would absorb an increase in their out-
put. Conventional distribution channels simply
were inadequate.
Simultaneously, the practice of off-list selling, a
la discount house, had been developing in this
industry.̂ ^ Although the sources of supply for these
enterprising discounters may at first have been
questionable, it soon became apparent to manufac-
turers that this new channel could absorb a great
portion of their output.^- At least two basic forces
were at play here.
First, as consumer needs for appliances lessened,
their desire for them became more difficult to stim-
ulate. The discounter sought to accomplish this with
reduced prices." This would not have been possi-
ble, however, except for the substantial and increas-
ing role of the manufacturer in marketing these prod-
ucts. That is, an "off-list" price meant little unless it
could be compared with a list price and a list price
signified little unless it could be associated with a
known and seemingly dependable product
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The second and accompanying force at play,
then, was the evolving phenomenon on the part of
manufacturers that has come to be known as
"preselling."" In other words, had not manufac-
turers through national advertising, guarantees,
warranties, and promulgated list prices persuaded
consumers of the intrinsic value of the appHances,
"bargain" prices would have meant little. This is not
to imply that manufacturers deliberately encour-
aged discounters' efforts. All that can logically be
inferred from the situation described is that the
concomitant occurrence of manufacturers' preselling
and retailers' discounting rendered the latter more
viable. To suppose causality here is to indulge in
idle speculation.
Traditional appliance dealers (and their distribu-
tors) saw the increasing volume of goods moving
through this new channel as a threat to their
security.̂ ^ While the discounting dealer could assert
that his lower prices were possible as a result of his
lower operating costs (principally fewer customer
services), the full-function dealer could not materi-
ally pare his operating costs without jeopardizing
his differential advantage. Basically, his argument
was that his customers wanted many attendant ser-
vices and were willing to pay for them. A dilemma
developed, however, as fewer and fewer consumers
could be counted as "his" customers.
Still another factor worked in favor of discount-
ers. As their volume of sales increased, their cost-
of-goods-sold tended to decline. This resulted both
from their growing ability to command greater
quantity discounts and from the likeliliood of direct
buying from manufacturers (that is, their sales
branches).
Fence-Straddling
In sum, then, manufacturers in their efforts to
sustain volume felt compelled to court the "new"
channel and sustain it through their preselling
efforts. At the same time, however, they could not
afford to alienate the middlemen comprising the
traditional channel, as the associated volume was
significant. This "fence-straddling" by manufac-
turers was accompanied by—perhaps induced—a
margin squeeze among some of the middlemen in-
volved. (A "margin squeeze" is not to be confused
with a profit squeeze, of course. Although the two
are often associated conceptually, the former does
not necessarily result in the latter. For example, in-
creased sales volume at a lower margin may yield a
higher profit margin.)
The Squeeze
Nature of the squeeze. From one direction, there
were forces exerting downward pressure on the re-
tail prices of appliances. Discounters' exploitation
of what they considered artificially high prices by
traditional dealers is a case in point. Also, to the ex-
tent that manufacturers' promotional efforts ren-
dered these products "patronage-indifferent," a lower
price afforded a dealer a possible means of insula-
tion. In other words, off-listing dealers reasoned
that, if consumers—as a result of manufacturers'
efforts—considered the source of their purchase to
be of minor significance, then a lower price would
certainly afford a particular dealer an otherwise non-
existent competitive advantage. Finally, as pre-
viously noted, there was the pressure from consum-
ers for lower prices. In particular, their sophistica-
tion as regards the discretionary nature of such a
purchase led many dealers to assume a basic price
elasticity for these goods. An atmosphere of pur-
chase urgency, therefore, could be effected only
through reduced, i.e., "bargain" prices.
As these factors—some voluntary, others imposed
—were exerting a widespread downward pressure
on retail prices, manufacturers recognized no par-
ticular reason to offer relief to middlemen. Indeed,
the manufacturers reasoned that, since they were
bearing the burden of demand stimulation among
consumers, middlemen had no equitable case for
relief. Instead of lowering their prices to middle-
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men, which would have cushioned the effect of
lower retail prices and thereby maintained tradi-
tional margins, manufacturers, for the most part,
held their prices. They reasoned that since the total
task of marketing had been reapportioned among
channel members—with an increased burden falhng
on manufacturers—margins should reflect tliis.
A point of clarification is in order here. To assert
that manufacturers were not disposed to lower their
prices to middlemen does not ipso facto suggest
that manufacturers wantonly depressed every mid-
dleman's operating margin. It means simply that, in
the manufacturer's perspective, relatively less mar-
keting effort was being exerted by middlemen.
And since margin is a price paid for tliis effort, re-
ductions were to be expected. Whether, in fact, a
given middleman's margin was reduced in the pro-
cess depended on his operating costs and cost-of-
goods-sold. Typically, discounting retailers were
not adversely affected but traditional middlemen,
dealers, and tbeir distributors, were. Manufacturers'
reluctance to relieve these middlemen reflects the
sine qua non of the margin squeeze.
The foregoing treatment is, of course, retrospec-
tive and culpable in tbat it tends to simplify a his-
torical series of events which was anything but sim-
ple and clear-cut as it was occurring.̂ '̂  Since the
present concern is only one of reference, however,
suffice it to say that, while prices received by retail-
ers were declining during this period, the prices
charged by manufacturers were not, with the result
that there developed a margin squeeze among some
middlemen.
As previously noted, by margin is meant the
difference between what a market intermediary re-
ceives for a product and what must be paid by the
intermediary for that product.
How to Measure Margin?
The inadequacy of data. For several reasons, the
measurement of middlemen's margins is an elusive
proposition. The role of arbiter of channel disputes
is typically ascribed to the manufacturer and, since
these often center around margin, he needs some
means of assessing the problems. Nevertheless, he
sometimes is unable to determine just who is in-
volved in the channel for his products. Thus he does
not know whose margins to measure. Additionally,
there is the problem introduced by various dis-
counts granted buyers by the manufacturer. In
other words, it is unreasonable to assume a uniform
cost of goods among all similar middlemen, i.e., all
distributors, in the channel.
Finally, even though margins may be specified in
the manufacturer's administered pricing schedule,
there is no assurance that these margins are actually
enjoyed by middlemen. Off-list selling to consumers
would render such margin assumptions essentially
meaningless. It is difficult, then, to measure middle-
men's margins with any significant precision and
without an inordinate research effort.
Use of CPI and WPI
A convenient expedient. An alternative to the
otherwise herculean task of gathering and inter-
preting margin data is afforded by reasonably ac-
cessible secondary data. For the present purpose,
the Consumer Price Index and Wholesale Price
Index may be used to determine useful, if imper-
fect, information about margins.
The rationale for using these measures is as fol-
lows: The Wholesale Price Index reflects prices
received at the first important commercial
transaction.^' In the case of appliances, this means
average prices received by manufacturers. The
Consumer Price Index, on the other hand, reflects
prices paid by consumers—that is, average prices
received by retailers. A comparison of the changes
in these indices over time, therefore, reflects
changes in middlemen's margins.
Some points merit consideration here. First, it
must be empbasized that a comparison of the CPI
and WPI does not measure margins; rather it
reflects changes in them. Specifically, it reflects the
temporal changes in the average margin available
to the aggregation of market intermediaries in the
distribution channel. Direct comparisons between
the retail (consumer) and wholesale index in a given
year are invahd as an indication of relative price
levels. Because the two indices are computed from
different components, in any given year, the whole-
sale index may exceed the consumer index. This
does not mean that, in such a year, wholesale prices
were higher than retail prices. Rather it indicates
that relative to the base period wholesale prices in-
creased more (or decreased less) than retail prices.
It should also be noted that since this scheme
reflects prices at only two levels—sales by manufac-
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turers and sales to consumers—it does not distin-
guish among middlemen. That is, the margin
changes it measures are those of the aggregation of
middlemen involved.
In support of the technique, the following points
should be considered. Even though it does not mea-
sure margins directly, by indicating changes in
them it may serve to signal an approaching conflict
or, if the change is positive, suggest opportunities
for exploitation. Although these advantages are
clouded somewhat by the fact that the technique
does not distinguish, for example, a retailer from a
wholesaler, certainly they are not thereby dissipated.
Tliis simply means that the technique (like quan-
titative tools in general) needs to be used in con-
junction with (in support of) the analyst's knowl-
edge of the phenomenon being studied. In this re-
gard, it may be likened to a physician's use of a
thermometer. An elevated temperature may be indi-
cated by this instrument but for diagnosis and pre-
scription of indicated treatment the physician must
call on his accumulated knowledge of medicine and
the patient and perhaps more measuring devices.
Similarly, a comparison of temporal changes in CPI
and WPI per se does no more than serve as a moni-
toring device for the distributive network of an in-
dustry. The efficacy of this device depends on who
uses it. A thermometer is invaluable to a physician,
useful to a nurse, a nuisance to the patient, and
dangerous in the hands of a cliild. Unless the pro-
posed technique can be applied to an existing knowl-
edge of the marketing practices of the industry, it is
hkely to be utterly useless or, indeed, dangerously
misinforming.
To illustrate the use of the technique described
above and to lend empirical support to some of the
phenomena previously outlined, the price indices
for the major household appliance industry may be
used. These data are displayed in Table I. The in-
dices apply to the entire product class; that is, they
reflect average prices for the several appliances
which constitute the industry, namely, ranges, re-
frigerators, freezers, dishwashers, washing ma-
chines, clothes dryers, and ironers. From the stand-
point of managerial application, these aggregate
measures are not as useful as would be those per-
taining to individual products. These latter indices
are also available but, inasmuch as the previous dis-
cussion has been at the industry level, an aggregate
measure of margin seems more appropriate for pur-















































SOURCE: For Wholesale Price Indices: U.S. Department of
Commerce, Office of Business Economics, Business Statistics, 1961
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 38.
For Consumer Price Indices: (1947-1958) U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index: Price
Indexes for Selected Items and Groups (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 6-9; (1959-1960) U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1960 Statistical
Supplement—Montldy Labor Review, Part I (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 21.
poses of illustration. It is understood, of course, that
these aggregate indices do not necessarily reflect
the margin changes associated with any particular
appliance or with any individual middleman. Rath-
er, they reflect a weighted average of the changes
associated with all of them.̂ ^
One flnal caveat is in order. Government price
indices do not purport to reflect all prices in effect
at a given transacUonal point. For example, tlie
Consumer Price Index for major household ap-
pliances is not intended to be interpreted as
reflecting prices paid by all consumers for all
appliances.̂ ^ Rather, this CPI derives from average
prices paid by "typical" families for "representative"
appliances in each category. Thus, margin changes
as measured by these indices may not agree precise-
ly with changes measured in some other fashion. In
all likelihood, these government price indices are
biased indicators for present purposes. They are
heavily weighted in favor of middle-income urban
dwellers purchasing other than "top-of-the-Iine" ap-
pliances. Nevertheless, as market analyses show,
this market segment is, for the most part, the most







FIG. 1.—NORMALIZED RATIOS OF G P I TO W P I FOR
MAJOR HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES, 1947-1960.
significant one. Therefore, although this technique
of measurement is imperfect, it is far from useless—
particularly when its relative cost is considered.
Measuring the margin squeeze. As suggested
above, margins cannot be measured simply by
direct comparison of the consumer and wholesale
price indices. By observing the year-to-year
changes in the ratio of these two indices, however,
margin changes may be inferred. Figure 1 depicts
the normalized ratios of the CPI to the WPI for
the period 1947-1960.-° These ratios are computed
as follows: For each year, the CPI is divided by the
WPI. For 1947, for example, this yields (98.4-^
97.1) a ratio of 1.013. To facilitate interpretation
tliis base-period ratio is arbitrarily set equal to one.
Each subsequent ratio is then divided by 1.013.
That is, for 1948 the computation is 103.0^
101.8 = 1.011 -^ 1.013 = 0.998. In other words, the
"normalized ratio" figures are index numbers based
on 1947 whose ratio equals one.
Since, by this system of reckoning, the 1947
ratio, i.e., 1.000, reflects the state of middlemen's
margins in the base period, any departure from
1.000 indicates a change in those margins. Specifi-
cally, ratios greater tlian one would signify larger
margins, and ratios less than one would mean
smaller margins. In the present case, the tendency
for the \^'PI to rise \\'hile the CPI was declining
is reflected in the declining CPI to WPI ratios
in Figure 1. In other words, there was a squeeze
in middlemen's margins in this industry between
1947 and 1960.
Again it should be emphasized that these ratios
do not measure middlemen's margins. Rather, what
is depicted in Figure 1 is a downward trend in the
ratio of the CPI to the \'\TI for these products and
therefore a change in margins. As the data show,
the squeeze began to loosen toward the latter part
of the period in question. During this latter period,
the WPI exhibited a rate of change more similar to
that of the CPI suggesting that eventually manufac-
turers' prices behaved more like those of retailers.
The manufacturer's role in the channel. It is cus-
tomary to think of the manufacturer as the "leader"
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in a marketing channel. To him falls the responsibil-
ity for maintaining order and reducing friction
among channel members. Where margins are con-
cerned, it is his task to assure at least workable
compromises. When some middlemen's margins are
jeopardized, one possible avenue of relief is lower
prices by manufacturers. To sustain a voluminous
flow of goods through tlie channel requires not
only response by manufacturers to legitimate mar-
gin pressures but also well-timed response. In other
words, relief that comes too late is tantamount to no
relief.
However, the ideal reaction time is problematic.
For example, a retailer typically is not immediately
aware that he is experiencing a squeeze in margin.
It takes time for him to determine that depressed
prices are not just an ephemeral occurrence. The
more middlemen so involved, the longer will be the
time elapsed before a manufacturer is even aware
of his dealers' plight. If such a plight is genuine, of
course, it deserves immediate relief, but, because of
inadequacies in the information systems involved,
this is impossible. Thus, even the most well-inten-
tioned manufacturer may appear a villain in the
eyes of afflicted middlemen.
Any computed "causes" of WPI variation are ques-
tionable because of this autocorrelation in WPI.
Second, there is tlie question of the dependence
of the two series. One of the fundamental assump-
tions made in regression analysis is that the series
being regressed are statistically independent. In
other words, the CPI and WPI must not be the
products of a common set of determinants if they
are to be characterized as "independent." Even
though these two series behaved far less "depen-
dently" than one's intuition might suppose, the fact
remains that any computed relationship between
them harbors an indeterminant element of over-
statement.
The third factor, and the one which most prompt-
ed analytical discretion, however, was the correla-
tion coefficients displayed in Table II. As these sta-
tistics show, it would be most heroic to assert a
functional relationslxip between changes in CPI and
WPI—lagged or not. These data indicate that for all
practical purposes nothing approaching concomi-
tant similarity exists in these series. And it taxes the
imagination to ascribe a causal dimension to a rela-
tionship which, at best, requires three years to come
to fruition.
No Operative Relationship
An empirical analysis. In an effort to determine
whether manufacturers respond to middlemen's
margin pressures with lower prices, a statistical
analysis of the problem was attempted. It was rea-
soned that, if manufacturers do respond to these
pressures, then changes in the CPI for major house-
hold appliances should explain a significant propor-
tion of the changes in the WPI. Further, any "sticki-
ness" in manufacturers' response would be refiected
by a lagged relationship between the two indices.
The analysis was spectacularly unsuccessful. No
sensible regression of WPI on CPI could be estab-
lished. Several reasons account for this.
First, since the data for analysis are time series,
there is the question of autocorrelation. That is, the
value of an index in any given year is not indepen-
dent of its value in previous years. A test for auto-
correlation. Hart's mean-square-successive-differ-
ence method, indicated its presence in both se-
ries. ̂ ^ Although a computational accommodation
can be introduced in order to cope with this compli-
cation, one does not do so with complete impunity.
TABLE n.—CORRELATION OF CPI WITH WPI FOR




























In tlie light of the autoregressive nature of the
WPI series and the unresolved question of its in-
dependence, it is difficult to attach any particular
meaning to the relationships depicted in Table II.
It may be statistically correct that CPI changes pre-
cede WPI changes by three, four, five, or six years,
but it is rather unlikely that this time lag reffects
any operative relationship between the two series.
Three to sLx years is time enough for too many vari-
ables to intervene.
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Possible Interpretations
Interpretation of findings. The abortive effort de-
scribed above indicates that the problem of ex-
plaining the behavior of the WPI in terms of the
CPI is not a "clean" one. Discretion must be exer-
cised lest "analysis" yield dangerous misinforma-
tion. That no reasonable relationsliip existed be-
tween the CPI and WPI, however, is useful to
know. To the extent that, during the period
1947-1960, some middlemen experienced a margin
squeeze, an absence of meaningful correlation be-
tween the two series suggests that manufacturers
were not particularly sensitive to the plight of
those middlemen so affected.
This suggests several interesting possibilities. For
one, the middleman's rationale for resale price
maintenance becomes eminently more reasonable.
Although the notion of resale price maintenance or
so-called "fair trade" has been roundly criticized in
the marketing literature, the condemnations tend to
be largely on an a priori basis.-- It is entirely possi-
ble that critics have hypothesized themselves right
out of the real world and that, in fact, retailers
may indeed have a case for relief.
The conventional wisdom, which alludes to the
stifiing effects of fair trade on competition, assumes
that retailers who favor it do so in order that they
may propagate or perpetuate inefficiency under an
umbrella of maintained prices. Perhaps so. How-
ever, if an otherwise efficient retailer determines
that, because of shrinking margins which the manu-
facturer is reluctant to cushion, he faces a moribund
prognosis, is he not compelled to plead for fair ti-ade
enforcement? He may not consider this the ideal
solution to his dilemma, but it is one solution.
The market forces giving rise to the structural
change in the distributive segment of this industry—
the emergence of a new, more streamlined channel
—were not wholly beneficial. Friction developed as
a result of some middlemen's inability to adjust rap-
idly to these forces. That the foregoing analysis has
failed to quantify the dimensions of this friction and
to articulate manufacturers' treatment of it does not
render it insignificant, however. Friction, per se, in
a marketing channel is to be discouraged and, in
the present case, the dimensions of the associated
distributive inefficiency seem to have been substan-
tial. In a dynamic world, friction may be the price
of improvement. Improvement (structural changes
in distribution channels, in this case) should be
sought—but always at the lowest possible price.
It would be useful to determine how widely the
methods used in this study have application. Clear-
ly, industries utilizing distribution channels that
comprise few middlemen afford the most lucrative
possibilities. For example, where a manufacturer-
retailer-consumer channel obtains, as often it does
for appliances, government price indices would
seem intuitively more valid a source for margin in-
formation than where more complicated channel
structures must be accommodated. Obviously, in-
dustries whose products are not reflected in the
Consumer Price Index are precluded from consid-
eration.
Finally, it might be interesting to determine em-
pirically whether middlemen's margins behave in
any diseernible liistorical pattern so that, armed
with this information, manufacturers might more
effectively contemplate long-range distribution
strategies. Such strategies might well lead to more
efficient marketing systems.
Conclusions
Summary. This paper has suggested a convenient
approach to the difficult, yet important, problem of
measuring middlemen's margins. The approach out-
lined is imperfect, to be sure. Indeed, by using the
Consumer Price Index and the Wholesale Price
Index for major household appliances, margins per
se were not measured. Rather, only changes in them
were treated. It might well be argued, however, that
it is not the margins themselves that are significant
but rather the changes therein that lead to problems
in marketing channels. Thus, perhaps the inherent
weakness in the proposed technique is more an aca-
demic question than an operational limitation.
There are certainly operational limitations on the
technique proposed, however. It is an indirect,
macro, measure of a marketing phenomenon that in
the last analysis should be evaluated on a micro
level. Its convenience comes at the cost of its inabil-
ity to distinguish among different types of resellers.
A note of caution is offered to those who would at-
tempt indiscriminately to apply the measiu-e, there-
fore. A great deal of circumstantial knowledge is
necessary before quasi-micro inferences can be
drawn.
90 California Management Review
Illustrating how the proposed technique might be
applied, a postwar margin squeeze in the major
household appliance industry was demonstrated.
The "squeeze" means simply that, during the period
in question, a decreasing percentage of the consum-
er price for appliances was available to compensate
market intermediaries for their efforts. Those mid-
dlemen—typically off-listing retailers in the "new"
channel—able to "live with" this occurrence had
only the normal competitive problems with which
to contend. Those traditional middlemen who, for
various reasons, were unable to adjust quickly expe-
rienced not only tbese problems but a margin
squeeze as well. If manufacturers offered any
significant relief (by way of lower prices) to these
middlemen, it was slow in coming.
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